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Abstract
In this paper is proposed a novel steganographic scheme based on chaotic iterations. This re-
search work takes place into the information hiding security fields. We show that the proposed
scheme is stego-secure, which is the highest level of security in a well defined and studied cate-
gory of attack called “watermark-only attack”. Additionally, we prove that this scheme presents
topological properties so that it is one of the firsts able to face, at least partially, an adversary when
considering the others categories of attacks defined in the literature.
1 Introduction
Robustness and security are two major concerns in information hiding [17, 13]. These two concerns
have been defined in [16] as follows. “Robust watermarking is a mechanism to create a communi-
cation channel that is multiplexed into original content [...]. It is required that, firstly, the perceptual
degradation of the marked content [...] is minimal and, secondly, that the capacity of the watermark
channel degrades as a smooth function of the degradation of the marked content. [...]. Watermarking
security refers to the inability by unauthorized users to have access to the raw watermarking channel.
[...] to remove, detect and estimate, write or modify the raw watermarking bits.” We will focus in
this research work on security.
In the framework of watermarking and steganography, security has seen several important de-
velopments since the last decade [5, 11, 18, 7]. The first fundamental work in security was made
by Cachin in the context of steganography [8]. Cachin interprets the attempts of an attacker to dis-
tinguish between an innocent image and a stego-content as a hypothesis testing problem. In this
document, the basic properties of a stegosystem are defined using the notions of entropy, mutual
information, and relative entropy. Mittelholzer, inspired by the work of Cachin, proposed the first
theoretical framework for analyzing the security of a watermarking scheme [19].
These efforts to bring a theoretical framework for security in steganography and watermarking
have been followed up by Kalker, who tries to clarify the concepts (robustness vs. security), and the
classifications of watermarking attacks [16]. This work has been deepened by Furon et al., who have
translated Kerckhoffs’ principle (Alice and Bob shall only rely on some previously shared secret
for privacy), from cryptography to data hiding [14]. They used Diffie and Hellman methodology,
and Shannon’s cryptographic framework [21], to classify the watermarking attacks into categories,
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according to the type of information Eve has access to [11, 20], namely: Watermarked Only Attack
(WOA), Known Message Attack (KMA), Known Original Attack (KOA), and Constant-Message
Attack (CMA). Levels of security have been recently defined in these setups. The highest level of
security in WOA is called stego-security [10], whereas topological-security tends to improve the
ability to withstand attacks in KMA, KOA, and CMA setups [15].
To the best of our knowledge, there exist only two information hiding schemes that are both
stego-secure and topologically-secure [15]. The first one is based on a spread spectrum technique
called Natural Watermarking. It is stego-secure when its parameter η is equal to 1 [10]. Unfortu-
nately, this scheme is neither robust, nor able to face an attacker in KOA and KMA setups, due to its
lack of a topological property called expansivity [15]. The second scheme both topologically-secure
and stego-secure is based on chaotic iterations [2]. However, it allows to embed securely only one bit
per embedding parameters. The objective of this research work is to improve the scheme presented
by authors of [2], in such a way that more than one bit can be embedded.
The remainder of this document is organized as follows. In Section 2, some basic recalls con-
cerning both chaotic iterations and Devaney’s chaos are given. In Section 3 are presented results and
information hiding scheme on which our work is based. Classes of attacks considered in this paper
are detailed in Section 4. Stego-security and topological-security are recalled too in this section. The
new information hiding scheme is given in Section 5. Its stego-security is studied in the next sec-
tion. The topological framework making it possible to evaluate topological-security is introduced in
Section 7. Then the topological properties of our scheme are investigated in the next section, leading
to the evaluation of its topological-security. This research work ends by a conclusion section where
our contribution is summarized and intended future researches are presented.
2 Basic Recalls
2.1 Chaotic Iterations
In the sequel Sn denotes the nth term of a sequence S and Vi is for the ith component of a vector V .
Finally, the following notation is used: J0;NK = {0,1, . . . ,N}.
Let us consider a system of a finite number N of elements (or cells), so that each cell has a
boolean state. A sequence of length N of boolean states of the cells corresponds to a particular state
of the system. A sequence that elements belong into J0;N−1K is called a strategy. The set of all
strategies is denoted by S.
Definition 1. The set B denoting {0,1}, let f : BN −→ BN be a function and S ∈ S be a strategy.
The so-called chaotic iterations are defined by x0 ∈BN and ∀(n, i) ∈N∗× J0;N−1K:
xni =
{
xn−1i if Sn 6= i,( f (xn−1))Sn if Sn = i.
2.2 Devaney’s Chaotic Dynamical Systems
Some topological definitions and properties taken from the mathematical theory of chaos are recalled
in this section.
Let (X ,d) be a metric space and f a continuous function on (X ,d).
Definition 2. f is said to be topologically transitive if, for any pair of open sets U,V ⊂ X , there
exists k > 0 such that f k(U)∩V 6=∅.
Definition 3. (X , f ) is said to be regular if the set of periodic points is dense in X .
Definition 4. f has sensitive dependence on initial conditions if there exists δ > 0 such that, for any
x ∈ X and any neighborhood V of x, there exist y ∈V and n > 0 such that d ( f n(x), f n(y))> δ.
δ is called the constant of sensitivity of f .
It is now possible to introduce the well-established mathematical definition of chaos [12],
Definition 5. A function f : X −→ X is said to be chaotic on X if:
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1. f is regular,
2. f is topologically transitive,
3. f has sensitive dependence on initial conditions.
When f is chaotic, then the system (X , f ) is chaotic and quoting Devaney: “it is unpredictable
because of the sensitive dependence on initial conditions. It cannot be broken down or simplified
into two subsystems which do not interact because of topological transitivity. And in the midst
of this random behavior, we nevertheless have an element of regularity”. Fundamentally different
behaviors are consequently possible and occur in an unpredictable way.
Let us finally remark that,
Theorem 1 ([4]). If a function is regular and topologicaly transitive on a metric space, then the
function is sensitive on initial conditions.
3 Information hiding based on chaotic iterations
3.1 Topology of Chaotic Iterations
In this section, we give the outline proofs establishing the topological properties of chaotic iterations.
As our scheme is inspired by the work of Guyeux et al. [15, 2, 1], the proofs detailed at the end of
this document will follow a same canvas.
Let us firstly introduce some notations and terminologies.
Definition 6. Let k ∈ N∗. A strategy adapter is a sequence which elements belong into J0,k−1K.
The set of all strategies with terms in J0,k−1K is denoted by Sk.
Definition 7. The discrete boolean metric is the application δ : B −→ B defined by δ(x,y) = 0 ⇔
x = y.
Definition 8. Let k ∈N∗. The initial function is the map ik defined by:
ik : Sk −→ J0,k−1K
(Sn)n∈N 7−→ S0
Definition 9. Let k ∈N∗. The shift function is the map σk defined by:
σk : Sk −→ Sk
(Sn)n∈N 7−→ (Sn+1)n∈N
Definition 10. Given a function f :BN →BN, the function Ff is defined by:
Ff : J0;N−1K×BN −→BN
(k,E) 7−→
(
E j.δ(k, j)+ f (E)k.δ(k, j)
)
j∈J0;N−1K
Definition 11. The phase space used for chaotic iterations is denoted by X1 and defined by X1 =
SN×B
N.
Definition 12. Given a function f :BN →BN, the map G f is defined by:
G f : X1 −→ X1
(S,E) 7−→ (σN(S),Ff (iN(S),E))
With these definitions, chaotic iterations can be described by the following iterations of the
discret dynamical system: {
X0 ∈ X1
∀k ∈N∗,Xk+1 = G f (Xk)
Finally, a new distance d1 between two points has been defined by:
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Definition 13 (Distance d1 on X1). ∀(S,E),( ˇS, ˇE) ∈ X1, d1((S,E);( ˇS, ˇE)) = dBN(E, ˇE)+dSN(S, ˇS),
where:
• d
BN
(E, ˇE) =
N−1
∑
k=0
δ(Ek, ˇEk) ∈ J0;NK
• dSN(S, ˇS) =
9
N
∞
∑
k=1
|Sk− ˇSk|
10k ∈ [0;1].
are respectively two distances on BN and SN (∀N ∈N∗).
Remark 1. This new distance has been introduced by authors of [1] to satisfy the following require-
ments. When the number of different cells between two systems is increasing, then their distance
should increase too. In addition, if two systems present the same cells and their respective strategies
start with the same terms, then the distance between these two points must be small, because the
evolution of the two systems will be the same for a while. The distance presented above follows
these recommendations.
It is then proven that,
Proposition 1. G f is a continuous function on (X1,d1), for all f :BN →BN.
Let us now recall the iteration function used by authors of [2].
Definition 14. The vectorial negation is the function defined by:
f0 : BN −→ BN
(b0, · · · ,bN−1) 7−→ (b0, · · · ,bN−1)
In the metric space (X1,d1), G f0 satisfies the three conditions for Devaney’s chaos: regularity,
transitivity, and sensitivity. So,
Theorem 2. G f0 is a chaotic map on (X1,d1) according to Devaney.
Finally, it has been stated in [1] that,
Proposition 2. The phase space X1 has, at least, the cardinality of the continuum.
3.2 Chaotic Iterations for Data Hiding
To explain how to use chaotic iterations for information hiding, we must firstly define the significance
of a given coefficient.
3.2.1 Most and Least Significant Coefficients
We first notice that terms of the original content x that may be replaced by terms issued from the
watermark y are less important than other: they could be changed without be perceived as such.
More generally, a signification function attaches a weight to each term defining a digital media,
depending on its position t.
Definition 15. A signification function is a real sequence (uk)k∈N.
Example 1. Let us consider a set of grayscale images stored into portable graymap format (P3-
PGM): each pixel ranges between 256 gray levels, i.e., is memorized with eight bits. In that context,
we consider uk = 8− (k mod 8) to be the k-th term of a signification function (uk)k∈N. Intuitively,
in each group of eight bits (i.e., for each pixel) the first bit has an importance equal to 8, whereas
the last bit has an importance equal to 1. This is compliant with the idea that changing the first bit
affects more the image than changing the last one.
Definition 16. Let (uk)k∈N be a signification function, m and M be two reals s.t. m < M.
• The most significant coefficients (MSCs) of x is the finite vector
uM =
(
k
∣∣ k ∈N and uk > M and k ≤| x |) ;
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• The least significant coefficients (LSCs) of x is the finite vector
um =
(
k
∣∣ k ∈N and uk ≤ m and k ≤| x |) ;
• The passive coefficients of x is the finite vector
up =
(
k
∣∣ k ∈N and uk ∈]m;M[ and k ≤| x |) .
For a given host content x, MSCs are then ranks of x that describe the relevant part of the image,
whereas LSCs translate its less significant parts. These two definitions are illustrated on Figure 1,
where the significance function (uk) is defined as in Example 1, M = 5, and m = 6.
(a) Original Lena. (b) MSCs of Lena. (c) LSCs of Lena (×17).
Figure 1: Most and least significant coefficients of Lena.
3.2.2 Presentation of the Scheme
Authors of [2] have proposed to use chaotic iterations as an information hiding scheme, as follows.
Let:
• (K,N) ∈ [0;1]×N be an embedding key,
• X ∈ BN be the N LSCs of a cover C,
• (Sn)n∈N ∈ J0,N−1KN be a strategy, which depends on the message to hide M ∈ [0;1] and K,
• f0 : BN → BN be the vectorial logical negation.
So the watermarked media is C whose LSCs are replaced by YK = XN , where:{
X0 = X
∀n < N,Xn+1 = G f0 (Xn) .
Two ways to generate (Sn)n∈N are given by these authors, namely Chaotic Iterations with In-
dependent Strategy (CIIS) and Chaotic Iterations with Dependent Strategy (CIDS). In CIIS, the
strategy is independent from the cover media C, whereas in CIDS the strategy will be dependent on
C. As we will use the CIIS strategy in this document, we recall it below. Finally, MSCs are not used
here, as we do not consider the case of authenticated watermarking.
3.2.3 CIIS Strategy
Let us firstly give the definition of the Piecewise Linear Chaotic Map (PLCM, see [22]):
F(x, p) =


x/p if x ∈ [0; p],
(x− p)/( 12 − p) if x ∈
[
p; 12
]
,
F(1− x, p) else,
where p ∈
]
0; 12
[
is a “control parameter”.
Then, the general term of the strategy (Sn)n in CIIS setup is defined by the following expression:
Sn = ⌊N×Kn⌋+1, where:
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

p ∈
[
0; 12
]
K0 = M⊗K
Kn+1 = F(Kn, p),∀n≤ N0
in which⊗ denotes the bitwise exclusive or (XOR) between two floating part numbers (i.e., between
their binary digits representation).
4 Data hiding security
4.1 Classification of Attacks
In the steganography framework, attacks have been classified in [10] as follows.
Definition 17. Watermark-Only Attack (WOA) occurs when an attacker has only access to several
watermarked contents.
Definition 18. Known-Message Attack (KMA) occurs when an attacker has access to several pairs
of watermarked contents and corresponding hidden messages.
Definition 19. Known-Original Attack (KOA) is when an attacker has access to several pairs of
watermarked contents and their corresponding original versions.
Definition 20. Constant-Message Attack (CMA) occurs when the attacker observes several water-
marked contents and only knows that the unknown hidden message is the same in all contents.
4.2 Stego-Security
In the prisoner problem of Simmons [23, 6], Alice and Bob are in jail, and they want to, possibly,
devise an escape plan by exchanging hidden messages in innocent-looking cover contents. These
messages are to be conveyed to one another by a common warden, Eve, who over-drops all contents
and can choose to interrupt the communication if they appear to be stego-contents.
The stego-security, defined in this framework, is the highest security level in WOA setup [10].
To recall it, we need the following notations:
• K is the set of embedding keys,
• p(X) is the probabilistic model of N0 initial host contents,
• p(Y |K1) is the probabilistic model of N0 watermarked contents.
Furthermore, it is supposed in this context that each host content has been watermarked with the
same secret key K1 and the same embedding function e.
It is now possible to define the notion of stego-security:
Definition 21 (Stego-Security). The embedding function e is stego-secure if and only if:
∀K1 ∈K, p(Y |K1) = p(X).
To the best of our knowledge, until now, only two schemes have been proven to be stego-secure.
On the one hand, the authors of [10] have established that the spread spectrum technique called
Natural Watermarking is stego-secure when its distortion parameter η is equal to 1. On the other
hand, it has been proven in [15] that:
Proposition 3. Chaotic Iterations with Independent Strategy (CIIS) are stego-secure.
4.3 Topological-Security
To check whether an information hiding scheme S is topologically-secure or not, S must be written
as an iterate process xn+1 = f (xn) on a metric space (X ,d). This formulation is always possible [3].
So,
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Definition 22 (Topological-Security). An information hiding scheme S is said to be topologically-
secure on (X ,d) if its iterative process has a chaotic behavior according to Devaney.
In the approach presented by Guyeux et al., a data hiding scheme is secure if it is unpredictable.
Its iterative process must satisfy the Devaney’s chaos property and its level of topological-security
increases with the number of chaotic properties satisfied by it.
This new concept of security for data hiding schemes has been proposed in [3] as a comple-
mentary approach to the existing framework. It contributes to the reinforcement of confidence into
existing secure data hiding schemes. Additionally, the study of security in KMA, KOA, and CMA
setups is realizable in this context. Finally, this framework can replace stego-security in situations
that are not encompassed by it. In particular, this framework is more relevant to give evaluation of
data hiding schemes claimed as chaotic.
5 The improved algorithm
In this section is introduced a new algorithm that generalize the scheme presented by authors of [2].
Let us firstly introduce the following notations:
• x0 ∈ BN is the N least significant coefficients of a given cover media C.
• m0 ∈ BP is the watermark to embed into x0.
• Sp ∈ SN is a strategy called place strategy.
• Sc ∈ SP is a strategy called choice strategy.
• Lastly, Sm ∈ SP is a strategy called mixing strategy.
Our information hiding scheme called Steganography by Chaotic Iterations and Substitution with
Mixing Message (SCISMM) is defined by ∀(n, i, j) ∈N∗× J0;N−1K× J0;P−1K:

xni =
{
xn−1i if Snp 6= i
mSnc if S
n
p = i.
mnj =


mn−1j if Snm 6= j
mn−1j if Snm = j.
where mn−1j is the boolean negation of m
n−1
j .
The stego-content is the boolean vector y = xP ∈ BN.
6 Study of stego-security
Let us prove that,
Proposition 4. SCISMM is stego-secure.
Proof. Let us suppose that x0 ∼ U(BN) and m0 ∼ U(BP) in a SCISMM setup. We will prove by a
mathematical induction that ∀n∈N,xn ∼U
(
B
N)
. The base case is obvious according to the uniform
repartition hypothesis.
Let us now suppose that the statement xn ∼ U
(
B
N) holds for some n. For a given k ∈ BN , we
denote by ˜ki ∈ BN the vector defined by: ∀i ∈ J0;N−1K, if k = (k0,k1, . . . ,ki, . . . ,kN−2,kN−1),
then ˜ki =
(
k0,k1, . . . ,ki, . . . ,kN−2,kN−1
)
.
Let Ei, j be the following events:
∀(i, j) ∈ J0;N−1K× J0;P−1K,Ei, j =
Sn+1p = i∧Sn+1c = j∧mn+1j = ki∧
(
xn = k∨ xn = ˜ki
)
,
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and p = P
(
xn+1 = k
)
. So,
p = P

 ∨
i∈J0;N−1K, j∈J0;P−1K
Ei, j

 .
We now introduce the following notation: P1(i) = P
(
Sn+1p = i
)
, P2( j) = P
(
Sn+1c = j
)
, P3(i, j) =
P
(
mn+1j = ki
)
, and P4(i) = P
(
xn = k∨ xn = ˜ki
)
.
These four events are independent in SCISMM setup, thus:
p = ∑
i∈J0;N−1K, j∈J0;P−1K
P1(i)P2(i)P3(i, j)P4(i).
According to Proposition 3, P
(
mn+1j = ki
)
= 12 . As the two events are incompatible:
P
(
xn = k∨ xn = ˜ki
)
= P(xn = k)+P
(
xn = ˜ki
)
.
Then, by using the inductive hypothesis: P(xn = k) = 12N , and P
(
xn = ˜ki
)
= 12N .
Let S be defined by
S = ∑
i∈J0;N−1K, j∈J0;P−1K
P1(i)P2( j).
Then p = 2× 12 ×
1
2N ×S =
1
2N ×S.
S can now be evaluated:
S = ∑i∈J0;N−1K, j∈J0;P−1K P1(i)P2( j)
= ∑i∈J0;N−1K P1(i)×∑ j∈J0;P−1K P2( j).
The set of events
{
Sn+1p = i
}
for i∈ J0;N−1K and the set of events
{
Sn+1c = j
}
for j ∈ J0;P−1K
are both a partition of the universe of possible, so S = 1.
Finally, P
(
xn+1 = k
)
= 12N , which leads to x
n+1 ∼ U
(
B
N)
. This result is true ∀n ∈ N, we
thus have proven that the stego-content y is uniform in the set of possible stego-content, so y ∼
U
(
B
N) when x∼ U(BN) .
7 Topological model
In this section, we prove that SCISMM can be modeled as a discret dynamical system in a topological
space. We will show in the next section that SCISMM is a case of topological chaos in the sense of
Devaney.
7.1 Iteration Function and Phase Space
Let
F : J0;N−1K×BN× J0;P−1K×BP −→BN
(k,x,λ,m) 7−→
(
δ(k, j).x j +δ(k, j).mλ
)
j∈J0;N−1K
where + and . are the boolean addition and product operations.
Consider the phase space X2 defined as follow:
X2 = SN ×B
N×SP×B
P×SP,
where SN and SP are the sets introduced in Section 5.
We define the map G f0 : X2 −→ X2 by:
G f0 (Sp,x,Sc,m,Sm) =
(σN(Sp),F(iN(Sp),x, iP(Sc),m),σP(Sc),G f0(m,Sm),σP(Sm))
Then SCISMM can be described by the iterations of the following discret dynamical system:{
X0 ∈ X2
Xk+1 = G f0(X
k).
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7.2 Cardinality of X2
By comparing X2 and X1, we have the following result.
Proposition 5. The phase space X2 has, at least, the cardinality of the continuum.
Proof. Let ϕ be the map defined as follow:
ϕ : X1 −→ X2
(S,x) 7−→ (S,x,0,0,0)
ϕ is injective. So the cardinality of X2 is greater than or equal to the cardinality of X1. And conse-
quently X2 has at least the cardinality of the continuum.
Remark 2. This result is independent on the number of cells of the system.
7.3 A New Distance on X2
We define a new distance on X2 as follow: ∀X , ˇX ∈X2, if X =(Sp,x,Sc,m,Sm) and ˇX =( ˇSp, xˇ, ˇSc, mˇ, ˇSm),
then:
d2(X , ˇX) = dBN(x, xˇ)+dBP(m, mˇ)
+ dSN (Sp, ˇSp)+dSP(Sc, ˇSc)+dSP(Sm, ˇSm),
where d
BN
, d
BP
, dSN , and dSP are the same distances than in Definition 13.
7.4 Continuity of SCISMM
To prove that SCISMM is another example of topological chaos in the sense of Devaney, G f0 must
be continuous on the metric space (X2,d2).
Proposition 6. G f0 is a continuous function on (X2,d2).
Proof. We use the sequential continuity.
Let ((Sp)n,xn,(Sc)n,mn,(Sm)n)n∈N be a sequence of the phase space X2, which converges to
(Sp,x,Sc,m,Sm). We will prove that (G f0((Sp)n,xn,(Sc)n,mn,(Sm)n))n∈N converges toG f0(Sp,x,Sc,m,Sm).
Let us recall that for all n, (Sp)n, (Sc)n and (Sm)n are strategies, thus we consider a sequence of
strategies (i.e., a sequence of sequences).
As d2(((Sp)n,xn,(Sc)n,mn,(Sm)n),(Sp,x,Sc,m,Sm)) converges to 0, each distance dBN(xn,x),
d
BP
(mn,m), dSN ((Sp)n,Sp), dSP((Sc)n,Sc), and dSP((Sm)n,Sm) converges to 0. But dBN(xn,x) and
d
BP
(mn,m) are integers, so ∃n0 ∈N,∀n > n0,dBN(xn,x) = 0 and ∃n1 ∈N,∀n > n1,dBP(mn,m) = 0.
Let n3 = Max(n0,n1). In other words, there exists a threshold n3 ∈ N after which no cell will
change its state: ∃n3 ∈N,n > n3 =⇒ (xn = x)∧ (mn = m).
In addition, dSN ((Sp)n,Sp)−→ 0, dSP((Sc)n,Sc)−→ 0, and dSP((Sm)n,Sm)−→ 0, so ∃n4,n5,n6 ∈
N,
• ∀n > n4,dSN ((Sp)n,Sp)< 10−1,
• ∀n > n5,dSP((Sc)n,Sc)< 10−1,
• ∀n > n6,dSP((Sm)n,Sm)< 10−1.
Let n7 = Max(n4,n5,n6). For n > n7, all the strategies (Sp)n, (Sc)n, and (Sm)n have the same
first term, which are respectively (Sp)0,(Sc)0 and (Sm)0 :∀n > n7,
((Sp)n0 = (Sp)0)∧ ((Sc)
n
0 = (Sc)0)∧ ((Sm)
n
0 = (Sm)0).
Let n8 = Max(n3,n7). After the n8−th term, states of xn and x on the one hand, and mn and m
on the other hand, are identical. Additionally, strategies (Sp)n and Sp, (Sc)n and Sc, and (Sm)n and
Sm start with the same first term.
Consequently, states of G f0((Sp)n,xn,(Sc)n,mn,(Sm)n) and G f0(Sp,x,Sc,m,Sm) are equal, so,
after the (n8)th term, the distance d2 between these two points is strictly smaller than 3.10−1, so
strictly smaller than 1.
We now prove that the distance between (G f0((Sp)n,xn,(Sc)n,mn,(Sm)n)) and (G f0(Sp,x,Sc,m,Sm))
is convergent to 0. Let ε > 0.
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• If ε> 1, we have seen that distance betweenG f0((Sp)n,xn,(Sc)n,mn,(Sm)n) andG f0(Sp,x,Sc,m,Sm)
is strictly less than 1 after the (n8)th term (same state).
• If ε< 1, then ∃k∈N,10−k > ε3 > 10
−(k+1)
. As dSN ((Sp)n,Sp), dSP((Sc)n,Sc) and dSP((Sm)n,Sm)
converges to 0, we have:
– ∃n9 ∈N,∀n > n9,dSN ((Sp)n,Sp)< 10−(k+2),
– ∃n10 ∈N,∀n > n10,dSP((Sc)n,Sc)< 10−(k+2),
– ∃n11 ∈N,∀n > n11,dSP((Sm)n,Sm)< 10−(k+2).
Let n12 = Max(n9,n10,n11) thus after n12, the k+ 2 first terms of (Sp)n and Sp, (Sc)n and Sc,
and (Sm)n and Sm, are equal.
As a consequence, the k + 1 first entries of the strategies of G f0((Sp)n,xn,(Sc)n,mn,(Sm)n) and
G f0(Sp,x,Sc,m,Sm) are the same (due to the shift of strategies) and following the definition of dSN
and dSP :
d2 (G f0((Sp)
n,xn,(Sc)n,mn,(Sm)n);G f0(Sp,x,Sc,m,Sm))
is equal to :
dSN ((Sp)
n,Sp)+dSP((Sc)
n,Sc)+dSP((Sm)
n,Sm)
which is smaller than 3.10−(k+1) 6 3. ε3 = ε.
Let N0 = max(n8,n12). We can claim that
∀ε > 0,∃N0 ∈N,∀n > N0,
d2 (G f0((Sp)
n,xn,(Sc)n,mn,(Sm)n);G f0(Sp,x,Sc,m,Sm))6 ε.
G f0 is consequently continuous on (X2,d2).
8 SCISMM is chaotic
To prove that we are in the framework of Devaney’s topological chaos, we have to check the regu-
larity, transitivity, and sensitivity conditions.
8.1 Regularity
Proposition 7. Periodic points of G f0 are dense in X2.
Proof. Let ( ˇSp, xˇ, ˇSc, mˇ, ˇSm) ∈ X2 and ε > 0. We are looking for a periodic point (S˜p, x˜, S˜c, m˜, S˜m)
satisfying d2(( ˇSp, xˇ, ˇSc, mˇ, ˇSm);(S˜p, x˜, S˜c, m˜, S˜m))< ε.
As ε can be strictly lesser than 1, we must choose x˜ = xˇ and m˜ = mˇ. Let us define k0(ε) =
⌊−log10( ε3 )⌋+1 and consider the set: S ˇSp, ˇSc, ˇSm,k0(ε)=
{
S ∈ SN ×SP×SP/((Sp)k = ˇSp
k
)∧ ((Sc)k = ˇSc
k
))
∧((Sm)k = ˇSm
k
)),∀k 6 k0(ε)
}
.
Then, ∀(Sp,Sc,Sm) ∈ S ˇSp, ˇSc, ˇSm,k0(ε), d2((Sp, xˇ,Sc, mˇ,Sm);( ˇSp, xˇ, ˇSc, mˇ, ˇSm)) < 3.
ε
3 = ε. It remains
to choose (S˜p, S˜p, S˜p)∈ S ˇSp, ˇSc, ˇSm,k0(ε) such that (S˜p, x˜, S˜c, m˜, S˜m) = (S˜p, xˇ, S˜c, mˇ, S˜m) is a periodic point
for G f0 .
Let J = {i ∈ J0;N−1K/xi 6= xˇi, where (Sp,x,Sc,m,Sm) = G k0f0 ( ˇSp, xˇ, ˇSc, mˇ, ˇSm)
}
, λ = card(J ),
and j0 < j1 < ... < jλ−1 the elements of J .
1. Let us firstly build three strategies: S∗p, S∗c , and S∗m, as follows.
(a) (S∗p)k = ˇSpk, (S∗c)k = ˇSck, and (S∗m)k = ˇSmk, if k 6 k0(ε).
(b) Let us now explain how to replace xˇ jq , ∀q ∈ J0;λ−1K:
First of all, we must replace xˇ j0 :
i. If ∃λ0 ∈ J0;P−1K/xˇ j0 = mλ0 , then we can choose (S∗p)k0+1 = j0, (S∗c)k0+1 = λ0,
(S∗m)k0+1 = λ0, and so I j0 will be equal to 1.
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ii. If such a λ0 does not exist, we choose:
(S∗p)k0+1 = j0, (S∗c)k0+1 = 0, (S∗m)k0+1 = 0,
(S∗p)k0+2 = j0, (S∗c)k0+2 = 0, (S∗m)k0+2 = 0,
and I j0 = 2.
All of the xˇ jq are replaced similarly. The other terms of S∗p, S∗c , and S∗m are constructed
identically, and the values of I jq are defined in the same way.
Let γ = ∑λ−1q=0 I jq .
(c) Finally, let (S∗p)k = (S∗p) j, (S∗c)k = (S∗c) j, and (S∗m)k = (S∗m) j, where j 6 k0(ε)+ γ is satis-
fying j ≡ k [mod (k0(ε)+ γ)], if k > k0(ε)+ γ.
So, G k0(ε)+γf0 (S
∗
p, xˇ,S∗c , mˇ,S∗m) = (S∗p, xˇ,S∗c ,m,S∗m). Let K = {i ∈ J0;P−1K/mi 6= mˇi, where
G
k0(ε)+γ
f0 (S
∗
p, xˇ,S∗c , mˇ,S∗m) = (S∗p, xˇ,S∗c ,m,S∗m)
}
,
µ = card(K ), and r0 < r1 < ... < rµ−1 the elements of K .
2. Let us now build the strategies S˜p, S˜c, S˜m.
(a) Firstly, let S˜pk = (S∗p)k, S˜c
k
= (S∗c)k, and S˜m
k
= (S∗m)k, if k 6 k0(ε)+ γ.
(b) How to replace mˇrq ,∀q ∈ J0;µ−1K:
First of all, let us explain how to replace mˇr0 :
i. If ∃µ0 ∈ J0;N−1K/xˇµ0 = mr0 , then we can choose S˜p
k0+γ+1
= µ0, S˜c
k0+γ+1
= r0,
S˜m
k0+γ+1
= r0.
In that situation, we define Jr0 = 1.
ii. If such a µ0 does not exist, then we can choose:
S˜p
k0+γ+1
= 0, S˜c
k0+γ+1
= r0, S˜m
k0+γ+1
= r0,
S˜p
k0+γ+2
= 0, S˜c
k0+γ+2
= r0, S˜m
k0+γ+2
= 0,
S˜p
k0+γ+3
= 0, S˜c
k0+γ+3
= r0, S˜m
k0+γ+3
= 0.
Let Jr0 = 3.
Then the other mˇrq are replaced as previously, the other terms of S˜p, S˜c, and S˜m are
constructed in the same way, and the values of Jrq are defined similarly.
Let α = ∑µ−1q=0 Jrq .
(c) Finally, let S˜pk = S˜p j, S˜ck = S˜c j, and S˜m
k
= S˜m
j
where j 6 k0(ε)+ γ+α is satisfying
j ≡ k [mod (k0(ε)+ γ+α)], if k > k0(ε)+ γ+α.
So, G k0(ε)+γ+αf0 (S˜p, xˇ, S˜c, mˇ, S˜m) = (S˜p, xˇ, S˜c, mˇ, S˜m)
Then, (S˜p, S˜c, S˜m) ∈ S ˇSp, ˇSc, ˇSm,k0(ε) defined as previous is such that (S˜m, xˇ, S˜m, mˇ, S˜m) is a periodic
point, of period k0(ε)+ γ+α, which is ε−close to ( ˇSp, xˇ, ˇSc, mˇ, ˇSm).
As a conclusion, (X2,G f0) is regular.
8.2 Transitivity
Proposition 8. (X2,G f0) is topologically transitive.
Proof. Let us define X : X2 → BN, such that X (Sp,x,Sc,m,Sm) = x and M : X2 → BP, such that
M (Sp,x,Sc,m,Sm) = m. Let
BA = B(XA,rA) and BB = B(XB,rB) be two open balls of X2, with
XA = ((Sp)A,xA,(Sc)A,mA,(Sm)A) and XB = ((Sp)B,xB,(Sc)B,mB,(Sm)B). We are looking for X˜ =
(S˜p, x˜, S˜c, m˜, S˜m) in BA such that ∃n0 ∈ N,Gn0f0 (X˜) ∈ BB.
X˜ must be in BA and rA can be strictly lesser than 1, so x˜ = xA and m˜ = mA. Let k0 = ⌊− log10(
rA
3 )+
1⌋. Let us notice SXA,k0 =
{
(Sp,Sc,Sm) ∈ SN× (SP)2/∀k 6 k0, (Skp = (Sp)kA)∧ (Skc = (Sc)kA)∧ (Skm = (Sm)kA))
}
.
Then ∀(Sp,Sc,Sm) ∈ SXA,k0 ,(Sp, x˜,Sc, m˜,Sm) ∈ BA.
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Let J = {i ∈ J0,N−1K/xˇi 6= X (XB)i, where
( ˇSp, xˇ, ˇSc, mˇ, ˇSm) = G k0f0 (XA)
}
, λ = card(J ),
and j0 < j1 < ... < jλ−1 the elements of J .
1. Let us firstly build three strategies: S∗p, S∗c , and S∗m as follows.
(a) (S∗p)k = (Sp)kA, (S∗c)k = (Sc)kA, and (S∗m)k = (Sm)kA, if k 6 k0.
(b) Let us now explain how to replace X (XB) jq , ∀q ∈ J0;λ−1K:
First of all, we must replace X (XB) j0 :
i. If ∃λ0 ∈ J0;P−1K/X (XB) j0 = mˇλ0 , then we can choose (S∗p)k0+1 = j0, (S∗c)k0+1 =
λ0, (S∗m)k0+1 = λ0, and so I j0 will be equal to 1.
ii. If such a λ0 does not exist, we choose:
(S∗p)k0+1 = j0, (S∗c)k0+1 = 0, (S∗m)k0+1 = 0,
(S∗p)k0+2 = j0, (S∗c)k0+2 = 0, (S∗m)k0+2 = 0
and so let us notice I j0 = 2.
All of the X (XB) jq are replaced similarly. The other terms of S∗p, S∗c , and S∗m are
constructed identically, and the values of I jq are defined on the same way.
Let γ = ∑λ−1q=0 I jq .
(c) (S∗p)k = (S∗p) j, (S∗c)k = (S∗c) j and (S∗m)k = (S∗m) j where j 6 k0 + γ is satisfying j ≡
k [mod (k0 + γ)], if k > k0 + γ.
So,G k0+γf0 ((S
∗
p,xA,S∗c ,mA,S∗m)) = (S∗p,xB,S∗c ,m,S∗m)
Let K =
{
i ∈ J0;P−1K/mi 6=M (XB)i, where
(S∗p,xB,S∗c ,m,S∗m) = G
k0+γ
f0 ((S
∗
p,xA,S∗c ,mA,S∗m))
}
,
µ = card(K ) and r0 < r1 < ... < rµ−1 the elements of K .
2. Let us secondly build three other strategies: S˜p, S˜c, S˜m as follows.
(a) S˜pk = (S∗p)k, S˜c
k
= (S∗c)k, and S˜m
k
= (S∗m)k, if k 6 k0 + γ.
(b) Let us now explain how to replace M (XB)rq ,∀q ∈ J0;µ−1K:
First of all, we must replace M (XB)r0 :
i. If ∃µ0 ∈ J0;N−1K/M (XB)r0 =(xB)µ0 , then we can choose S˜p
k0+γ+1
= µ0, S˜c
k0+γ+1
=
r0, S˜m
k0+γ+1
= r0, and Jr0 will be equal to 1.
ii. If such a µ0 does not exist, we choose: S˜p
k0+γ+1
= 0, S˜c
k0+γ+1
= r0, S˜m
k0+γ+1
= r0,
S˜p
k0+γ+2
= 0, S˜c
k0+γ+2
= r0, S˜m
k0+γ+2
= 0,
S˜p
k0+γ+3
= 0, S˜c
k0+γ+3
= r0, S˜m
k0+γ+3
= 0,
and so let us notice Jr0 = 3.
All the M (XB)rq are replaced similarly. The other terms of S˜p, S˜c, and S˜m are con-
structed identically, and the values of Jrq are defined on the same way.
Let α = ∑µ−1q=0 Jrq .
(c) ∀k ∈ N∗, S˜pk0+γ+α+k = (Sp)kB, S˜c
k0+γ+α+k
= (Sc)kB, and S˜m
k0+γ+α+k
= (Sm)kB.
So, G k0+γ+αf0 (S˜p,xA, S˜c,mA, S˜m) = XB, with (S˜p, S˜c, S˜m) ∈ SXA,k0 . Then X˜ = (S˜p,xA, S˜c,mA, S˜m) ∈
X2 is such that X˜ ∈ BA and G k0+γ+αf0 (X˜) ∈ BB. Finally we have proven the result.
8.3 Sensitivity on Initial Conditions
Proposition 9. (X2,G f0) has sensitive dependence on initial conditions.
Proof. G f0 is regular and transitive. Due to Theorem 1, G f0 is sensitive.
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8.4 Devaney’s topological chaos
In conclusion, (X2,G f0) is topologically transitive, regular, and has sensitive dependence on initial
conditions. Then we have the result.
Theorem 3. G f0 is a chaotic map on (X2,d2) in the sense of Devaney.
So we can claim that:
Theorem 4. SCISMM is topologically-secure.
9 Conclusion
In this research work, a new information hiding scheme has been introduced. It is topologically-
secure and stego-secure, and thus is able to withstand attacks in Watermark-Only Attack (WOA)
and Constant-Message Attack (CMA) setups. These results have been obtained after having studied
the topological behavior of this data hiding scheme. To the best of our knowledge, this algorithm
is the third scheme that has been proven to be secure, according to the information hiding security
field.
In future work, we intend to study the robustness of this scheme, and to compare it with the two
other secure algorithms. Additionally, we will investigate the topological properties of our scheme,
to see whether it is secure in KOA and KMA setups.
13
References
[1] Jacques Bahi and Christophe Guyeux. Hash functions using chaotic iterations. Journal of
Algorithms & Computational Technology, 4(2):167–181, 2010.
[2] Jacques Bahi and Christophe Guyeux. A new chaos-based watermarking algorithm. In SE-
CRYPT 2010, International conference on security and cryptography, Athens, Greece, 2010.
To appear.
[3] Jacques M. Bahi and Christophe Guyeux. A chaos-based approach for information hiding
security. arXiv No 0034939, April 2010.
[4] J. Banks, J. Brooks, G. Cairns, and P. Stacey. On devaney’s definition of chaos. Amer. Math.
Monthly, 99:332–334, 1992.
[5] Mauro Barni, Franco Bartolini, and Teddy Furon. A general framework for robust watermark-
ing security. Signal Processing, 83(10):2069–2084, 2003. Special issue on Security of Data
Hiding Technologies, invited paper.
[6] Richard Bergmair and Stefan Katzenbeisser. Content-aware steganography: About lazy pris-
oners and narrow-minded wardens. In Camenisch et al. [9], pages 109–123.
[7] Maria Bras-Amoro´s and Josep Domingo-Ferrer. On overlappings of digitized straight lines and
shared steganographic file systems. Transactions on Data Privacy, 1(3):131–139, 2008.
[8] Christian Cachin. An information-theoretic model for steganography. Information and Com-
putation, 192:41 – 56, 2004.
[9] Jan Camenisch, Christian S. Collberg, Neil F. Johnson, and Phil Sallee, editors. Information
Hiding, 8th International Workshop, IH 2006, Alexandria, VA, USA, July 10-12, 2006. Revised
Selcted Papers, volume 4437 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer, 2007.
[10] Francois Cayre, Caroline Fontaine, and Teddy Furon. Kerckhoffs-based embedding security
classes for woa data hiding. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, 3(1):1–
15, 2008.
[11] Franois Cayre, Caroline Fontaine, and Teddy Furon. Watermarking security: theory and prac-
tice. IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing, 53(10):3976–3987, 2005.
[12] Robert L. Devaney. An Introduction to Chaotic Dynamical Systems. Addison-Wesley, Red-
wood City, CA, 2nd edition, 1989.
[13] Josep Domingo-Ferrer and Maria Bras-Amoro´s. A shared steganographic file system with
error correction. In Vicenc¸ Torra and Yasuo Narukawa, editors, MDAI, volume 5285 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, pages 227–238. Springer, 2008.
[14] T. Furon. Security analysis, 2002. European Project IST-1999-10987 CERTIMARK, Deliver-
able D.5.5.
[15] Christophe Guyeux, Nicolas Friot, and Jacques Bahi. Chaotic iterations versus spread-
spectrum: chaos and stego security. In IIH-MSP’10, 6-th Int. Conf. on Intelligent Informa-
tion Hiding and Multimedia Signal Processing, pages 208–211, Darmstadt, Germany, October
2010.
[16] T. Kalker. Considerations on watermarking security. pages 201–206, 2001.
[17] Stefan Katzenbeisser and Jana Dittmann. Malicious attacks on media authentication schemes
based on invertible watermarks. In Edward J. Delp and Ping Wah Wong, editors, Security,
Steganography, and Watermarking of Multimedia Contents, volume 5306 of Proceedings of
SPIE, pages 838–847. SPIE, 2004.
[18] Andrew D. Ker. Batch steganography and pooled steganalysis. In Camenisch et al. [9], pages
265–281.
[19] Thomas Mittelholzer. An information-theoretic approach to steganography and watermarking.
In Andreas Pfitzmann, editor, Information Hiding, volume 1768 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, pages 1–16, Dresden, Germany, September 29 - October 1. 1999. Springer.
14
[20] Luis Perez-Freire, F. Prez-gonzalez, and Pedro Comesaa. Secret dither estimation in lattice-
quantization data hiding: A set-membership approach. In Edward J. Delp and Ping W. Wong,
editors, Security, Steganography, and Watermarking of Multimedia Contents, San Jose, Cali-
fornia, USA, January 2006. SPIE.
[21] Claude E. Shannon. Communication theory of secrecy systems. Bell Systems Technical Jour-
nal, 28:656–715, 1949.
[22] Li Shujun, Li Qi, Li Wenmin, Mou Xuanqin, and Cai Yuanlong. Statistical properties of digital
piecewise linear chaotic maps and their roles in cryptography and pseudo-random coding. Pro-
ceedings of the 8th IMA International Conference on Cryptography and Coding, 1:205–221,
2001.
[23] Gustavus J. Simmons. The prisoners’ problem and the subliminal channel. In Advances in
Cryptology, Proc. CRYPTO’83, pages 51–67, 1984.
15
